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Abstract
The Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge was announced in 2015 along with a pub-
lication of a huge dataset of nearly 0.5 terabytes, consisting of disassembly and bytecode of
more than 20K malware samples. Apart from serving in the Kaggle competition, the dataset
has become a standard benchmark for research on modeling malware behaviour. To date,
the dataset has been cited in more than 50 research papers. Here we provide a high-level
comparison of the publications citing the dataset. The comparison simplifies finding potential
research directions in this field and future performance evaluation of the dataset.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the malware industry has become a large and well-organized market [45]. Well
funded, multi-player syndicates heavily invest in technologies and capabilities built to evade tradi-
tional protection, requiring anti-malware vendors to develop counter-mechanisms for finding and
deactivating them. In the meantime, they inflict significant financial loss to users of computer
systems.
One of the major challenges that anti-malware software faces today are the vast amounts of
data which needs to be evaluated for potential malicious intent. For example, Microsoft’s real-
time anti-malware detection products executes on over 600M computers worldwide [36]. This
generates tens of millions of daily data points to be analyzed as potential malware. One of the
main reasons for these high volumes of different files is that in order to evade detection, malware
authors introduce polymorphism to the malicious components. This means that malicious files
belonging to the same malware “family”, with the same forms of malicious behavior, are constantly
modified and/or obfuscated using various tactics, so that they appear to be many different files.
A first step in effectively analyzing and classifying such a large number of files is to group them
and identify their respective families. In addition, such grouping criteria may be applied to new
files encountered on computers in order to detect them as malicious and of a certain family. To
facilitate research in this area, especially in the development of effective techniques for grouping
variants of malware files into their respective families, Microsoft provided the data science and
security communities with a malware dataset of unprecedented size. Here we summarize the many
uses of this dataset, published to date.
2 Dataset
The malware dataset is almost half a terabyte when uncompressed. It consists of a set of known
malware files representing a mix of 9 different families. Each malware file has an identifier, a 20
character hash value uniquely identifying the file, and a class label, which is an integer representing
one of the 9 family names to which the malware may belong (See Table 1). For each file, the raw
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Table 1: Malware families in the dataset
Family Name # Train Samples Type
Ramnit 1541 Worm
Lollipop 2478 Adware
Kelihos_ver3 2942 Backdoor
Vundo 475 Trojan
Simda 42 Backdoor
Tracur 751 TrojanDownloader
Kelihos_ver1 398 Backdoor
Obfuscator.ACY 1228 Any kind of obfuscated malware
Gatak 1013 Backdoor
data contains the hexadecimal representation of the file’s binary content, without the header (to
ensure sterility). The dataset also includes a metadata manifest, which is a log containing various
metadata information extracted from the binary, such as function calls, strings, etc. This was
generated using the IDA disassembler tool. The original question posed to participants was to
classify malware to one of the 9 classes. The dataset can be downloaded from the competition
website.1
3 Citations Comparison
Since the end of the competition in April 2015, more than 50 research papers and thesis works cited
the competition and the dataset. Among the citations, several papers are not in English, which we
are unable to read [9, 33, 6, 35]. The remaining articles can be divided into two principal classes.
The first category of papers referenced the challenge to either perform an abstract comparison
or highlight the importance of machine learning for malware classification in industry, where the
size of data is huge [43, 19, 28, 47, 18, 38, 49, 44, 25, 53, 46, 21, 4, 57, 16, 17, 39, 50]. Papers
in the second category performed partial or complete evaluation on the dataset to verify the
effectiveness and/or efficiency of their proposed approach for various tasks. We list the papers of
the second category in Table 2 sorted by the publication date. Moreover, we summarize the main
contribution or focus of each paper to make higher level clusters. Feature engineering, feature
selection/fusion, being scalable, being robust, malware authorship attribution, detecting concept
drift, performing a measurement, similarity hashing, classification techniques and deep learning are
the major contributions of the papers. The diversity of the contributions has made the dataset a
benchmark for various tasks, helping researchers provide a standard for evaluation and comparison.
4 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper, we provide a short description of the characteristics of the Microsoft Malware Classi-
fication Challenge dataset. This dataset is becoming a standard dataset with more than 50 papers
citing it. We enumerated these references as much as possible and compared their main contribu-
tions with respect to the dataset. The comparison helps the understanding of what the existing
contributions are, and what the potential research directions can be.
The authors aim to keep the reference table updated. We encourage the community to cite this
paper when using the dataset, and update us about such work so it can be added to this paper.
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